America, Technology and Strategic Culture
This book investigates the extent to which culture shapes how technology is used to attain national strategic objectives in the military domain. The author argues that Clausewitz's conception of the nature of war and the meaning of strategy are still relevant and enduring. The confluent relationship between technology, culture, and military strategic behaviour is then considered in this light.
The United States offers an extreme example of a nation that is highly technological in its socio-economic orientation and, as a result, in its approach to statecraft. The situation in which America currently finds itself in Iraq is the direct result of its habit of substituting technology for strategy, the author claims.
This habit manifests itself in the form of the Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)/Effects-Based Operations (EBO) construct, which by and large has failed to deliver on its many promises. The fundamental problem with this construct is that it centres on the technological dimension of war, rather than on war's human dynamic.
As a result, it is argued, America will continue to experience significant deficiencies in its ability to obtain political goals through military force unless and until it amends its strategic approach to be more human-centric and less technology-centric. In so doing, America must make a conscious, well-sustained effort to counter its strategic cultural predispositions, and to practice a more holistic brand of strategy than heretofore.
America, Technology and Strategic Culture will be of much interest to students of Clausewitz, Strategic Studies, International Security and US politics.
This book investigates the extent to which culture shapes how technology is used to attain national strategic objectives in the military domain. The author argues that Clausewitz's conception of the nature of war and the meaning of strategy are still relevant and enduring. The confluent relationship between technology, culture, and military strategic behaviour is then considered in this light.
The United States offers an extreme example of a nation that is highly technological in its socio-economic orientation and, as a result, in its approach to statecraft. The situation in which America currently finds itself in Iraq is the direct result of its habit of substituting technology for strategy, the author claims.
This habit manifests itself in the form of the Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)/Effects-Based Operations (EBO) construct, which by and large has failed to deliver on its many promises. The fundamental problem with this construct is that it centres on the technological dimension of war, rather than on war's human dynamic.
As a result, it is argued, America will continue to experience significant deficiencies in its ability to obtain political goals through military force unless and until it amends its strategic approach to be more human-centric and less technology-centric. In so doing, America must make a conscious, well-sustained effort to counter its strategic cultural predispositions, and to practice a more holistic brand of strategy than heretofore.
America, Technology and Strategic Culture will be of much interest to students of Clausewitz, Strategic Studies, International Security and US politics.
Description
This book investigates the extent to which culture shapes how technology is used to attain national strategic objectives in the military domain. The author argues that Clausewitz's conception of the nature of war and the meaning of strategy are still relevant and enduring. The confluent relationship between technology, culture, and military strategic behaviour is then considered in this light.
The United States offers an extreme example of a nation that is highly technological in its socio-economic orientation and, as a result, in its approach to statecraft. The situation in which America currently finds itself in Iraq is the direct result of its habit of substituting technology for strategy, the author claims.
This habit manifests itself in the form of the Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)/Effects-Based Operations (EBO) construct, which by and large has failed to deliver on its many promises. The fundamental problem with this construct is that it centres on the technological dimension of war, rather than on war's human dynamic.
As a result, it is argued, America will continue to experience significant deficiencies in its ability to obtain political goals through military force unless and until it amends its strategic approach to be more human-centric and less technology-centric. In so doing, America must make a conscious, well-sustained effort to counter its strategic cultural predispositions, and to practice a more holistic brand of strategy than heretofore.
America, Technology and Strategic Culture will be of much interest to students of Clausewitz, Strategic Studies, International Security and US politics.
